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INTRODUCTION 
Competent patients have the right to refuse life sustaining medical treatment. This so 
called “right to die” is recognized because of the value that medical ethics and the law attribute 
to individual autonomy in the context of end-of-life medical decisions. The choice to refuse life 
sustaining treatment is conditioned on the patient’s competency. Competent individuals are best 
situated to make treatment decisions because the outcome of these decisions ultimately affects 
their lives. Also competent patients are able to express their wishes regarding life sustaining 
treatment. Conditioning the removal of life sustaining treatment on the determination of an 
individual’s competency inevitably raises the issue over what exactly it means for someone to be 
competent. When courts address the issue of competency, the court’s determination is regarded 
as an objective one reached in light of the evidence.  
However, in most cases it is not clear what the relevant considerations are when courts 
“objectively” determine an individual’s competence. Without a clear standard to deal with the 
issue of competency, courts will inevitably base their decisions on subjective considerations. For 
example, two individuals who are adequately able to utilize a rationale thought process in order 
to determine their wishes in regards to the course of their medical treatment can be treated by 
courts differently based a value-laden analysis regarding the patient’s quality of life and the 
desirability of the outcome of the patients medical treatment decision. Whether a person’s 
decision to refuse treatment is rational becomes independent of their competency to make the 
decision. Unfortunately, competency becomes dependent on considerations that are different 
from a patient’s ability to choose their treatment. In the absence of clear standards the 
competency analysis inevitably turns into a subjective determination that does not reflect an 
individual’s actual competence. Resulting decisions based on considerations reflecting 
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underlying values, which may not necessarily be shared by the patient in our diverse society, fail 
to promote the competent patient’s autonomy and protect the incompetent patient from his 
choices.  Persons who are incompetent to refuse life sustaining treatment could be allowed to do 
so while persons who are actually competent could have their request to withdraw life sustaining 
treatment denied, forcing them to relinquish control over invasive treatment of their own bodies. 
Decisions based on subjective considerations will inevitably fail patients faced with these 
difficult circumstances. If the law’s objective is to promote the competent individual’s 
autonomy, then standards should be used to accurately determine competency.  
This article examines competency determinations by courts when the individual is 
conscious and in a position to receive life sustaining treatment. This article seeks to establish that 
competency determinations, while labeled an objective determination, inevitably rely on 
subjective inquiries that do not reflect the competency or intent of individuals who allege that 
they want to discontinue life sustaining treatment. Part I will discuss the establishment and 
sources of the right to refuse life sustaining treatment. Part II examines competency, its 
vagueness, and will discuss judicial evaluations in cases involving the refusal of life sustaining 
treatment, where the issue of an individual’s competency is raised. Part III advocates potential 
solutions to protect patient autonomy by making parties less reliant on the courts, so that 
determinations of competency better reflect the actual competency of a person refusing life 
sustaining treatment. 
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I. THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT 
 
A. Autonomy and Informed Consent 
 
The right to refuse medical treatment, also known as the right to die, is rooted in the 
doctrine of informed consent developed by the law and principles of medical ethics. Generally, 
medical ethics focuses on three principles: autonomy, beneficence, and non-maleficence.
1
 
Autonomy refers to the principle that an individual has a right to make decisions regarding 
medical treatment because individuals are the sovereigns of their bodies.
2
 In its purest form, 
autonomy presumes that no other person or institution should be allowed to overrule individual 
choice, regardless of whether the individual came to the “right” choice from another’s 
perspective.
3
 Beneficence represents the principle in medical ethics that a physician has a duty to 
provide health care in the best interests of their patients, while non-maleficence represents the 
physician’s duty not cause harm to their patients.4 Autonomy is counterbalanced in medical care 
and the law by paternalism. Paternalism reflects the notion that individuals other than the patient 
themselves desire to make medical treatment decisions on their behalf in what is perceived to be 
the patient’s best interest.5  
Historically, in medical care, the purpose of disclosing information was not for the sake 
of the patient so he could make a decision regarding his care, but for the sake of the physician in 
order to get the patient to agree to what the doctor wanted.
6
 Over the course of the nineteenth 
century, the doctrine of informed consent developed out of a strong judicial deference toward 
individual autonomy, the belief that individuals should be free from the interference of others 
                                                 
1 James E. Szalados, Discontinuation of Mechanical Ventilation at End-of-Life: The Ethical and Legal Boundaries 
of Physician Conduct in Termination of Life Support, in  23 CRITICAL CARE CLINICS 317,  319 (2007).  
2 Id.  
3 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 1420 (6th ed. 2008). 
4 Szalados, supra note 1, at 319-20 
5 Id. at 319 
6 FURROW ET AL., supra note 3, at  231  
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and accordingly should not be forced to act against their will.
7
 The principle of autonomy applied 
to the medical context was articulated by Judge Cardozo when he stated “every human being of 
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.”8 
Stated briefly, the common law doctrine of informed consent stands for the proposition that “no 
medical procedure may be performed without a patient’s consent, obtained after explanation of 
the nature of the treatment, substantial risks, and alternative therapies.”9 
B. Foundation of the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment 
The first United States Supreme Court case to deal with the issue of whether there is a 
constitutionally protected “right to die” was Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of 
Health.
10
 The case involved Nancy Cruzan who became comatose as a result of an automobile 
accident.
11
 Nancy Cruzan’s parents decided that they wanted to remove her from life sustaining 
treatment when it became clear that their daughter would not recover.
12
 The hospital refused to 
remove artificial hydration and nutrition from her until there was a court order to do so.
13
 The 
Supreme Court of Missouri found that Missouri law required a showing of clear and convincing 
evidence of an individual’s intent to remove life sustaining treatment and subsequently 
determined that there was insufficient evidence to meet that standard.
14
 The United States 
Supreme Court upheld the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision on the basis that the State had an 
interest in protecting life.
15
 The Court recognized that the right to die could be inferred from their 
earlier decisions based on the liberty interest in the Fourteenth Amendment and assumed “for the 
                                                 
7 Id. at 230-32 
8 Id. at 231(citing Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125 (1914)) 
9 SZALADOS, supra note 1, at 320 (quoting Cantor, A Patient’s Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: 
Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228, 43 (1973)) 
10 497 U.S. 261 (1990) 
11 Id. at 265-68 
12 Id. at 267 
13 Id.  
14 Id. at 267-69 
15 Id. at 279-85 
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purposes of this case… that the United States Constitution would grant a competent person a 
constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.”16 Although the 
Court avoided actually holding that the constitution grants the “right to die,” many authoritative 
sources presumed that the opinion recognized a constitutionally protected liberty interest rooted 
in the fourteenth amendment allowing a competent person to refuse unwanted medical 
treatment.
17
  
Aside from the United States Constitution, there are three sources that courts generally 
refer to as the basis of right to refuse medical treatment: state constitutions, state law, and the 
common law doctrine of informed consent.
18
 Some courts, such as the California Court of 
Appeals in Bouvia v. Superior Court, upheld the patient’s right to have life sustaining treatment 
removed based on the express right of privacy found in California’s constitution.19 The right to 
refuse treatment can also be exercised through statutorily created advanced directives. The 
premise of advanced directives is to encapsulate patient intent so that their wishes may be 
executed in the event that those wishes can no longer be determined from the patient themselves. 
However, such documents tend to run into issues of interpretation and ambiguity due to the 
unpredictability inherent in the end of life treatment context; situations can arise during which an 
advanced directive does not give much guidance.
20
  
C. Countervailing State Interests 
The ethical and legal justification supporting an individual’s choice to refuse life 
sustaining treatment is primarily rooted in recognition of individual autonomy from which the 
common law doctrine of informed consent developed. The issue over whether individuals should 
                                                 
16 Id. at 279 
17 Id. at  1420 
18 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269-74 
19 179 Cal.App.3d 1127, 1137 (Ct. App. 1986) 
20 SZALADOS, supra note 1, at 312-22 
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be allowed to refuse life sustaining treatment is controversial in the end of life context, especially 
when compared to other medical treatment choices. This is because of the stakes that are 
involved; the individual’s choice regarding the course of treatment foreseeably affects whether 
that person lives or dies. When an individual decides that they do not wish to continue life 
sustaining treatment, the principles of autonomy and beneficence conflict. On the one hand we 
want to allow persons to make their own decisions regarding their own treatment, but when their 
decision foreseeably results in death, from an external perspective it would seem that the patient 
is choosing a course of action that results in bodily harm against their interest. Despite our 
society’s reverence for individual autonomy and the law’s emphasis on autonomy in the context 
of medical treatment, the advent of life sustaining treatment has created a contentious debate 
over the limits of autonomy. The fundamental issue related to this conflict is where the law 
draws the line between suicide and refusal of life sustaining medical treatment.  
 As Justice Scalia noted in his concurrence in Cruzan, the law in America has long 
recognized the power of the State to prevent individuals from committing suicide.
21
 In addition 
to the prevention of suicide courts have commonly identified other state interests which justify 
preventing the cessation of life sustaining treatment. In Superintendent of Belchertown State 
School v. Saikewicz the Supreme Court of Massachusetts indentified four state interests which 
conflict with the right to die: (1) preservation of life; (2) protection of the interests of innocent 
third parties; (3) prevention of suicide; and (4) maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical 
profession.
22
 Although this particular case involved an incompetent patient, the interests of the 
state asserted there have also been cited in cases involving competent patients.
23
 When patients 
                                                 
21 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
22 373 Mass. 728, 741 (1977) 
23 FURROW ET AL., supra note 3, at 1432 
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attempt to exercise their autonomy at the end of life, courts balance the patient’s autonomy 
against state interests.  
 The debate over whether or not an individual can actually exercise the right to refuse life 
sustaining medical treatment revolves around the determination of competence which 
consequently is a question of the intent of the patient. This is because autonomy is the basis for 
the legal doctrine of informed consent and therefore the right to refuse medical treatment. 
Without requiring a sufficient showing of the patient’s intent to refuse medical treatment, a 
patient could be forced to accept treatment decisions against his will, thereby violating the 
principle of autonomy. The stronger the showing of a competent patient’s intent, regarding end 
of life medical treatment, the greater the balance between state interests and individual autonomy 
tips in favor of autonomy.   
As a whole our society disfavors medical treatment decisions which will result in the 
death of the patient, a bias which is evidenced by the increasing costs of palliative care that we 
have seen in recent years. While suicide itself is no longer treated as a criminal act, aiding and 
abetting or soliciting suicide both represent acts that are generally criminalized in state statutes.
24
 
If the intent of the patient who refuses life sustaining treatment is simply to die, and a court 
believes that the patient was incompetent, then the removal of life sustaining treatment is not 
viewed as a medical treatment decision, but as suicide. The most obvious issue is whether 
paternalism, deciding what is best for the patient, can be exercised by the courts in a manner that 
does not deprive competent patients of their autonomy and subsequently their right to refuse life 
sustaining treatment.  
 
                                                 
24 SZALADOS, supra note 1, at 327 
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II. DETERMINING PATIENT COMPETENCY 
II A. Variance in the Competency Standard 
The determination of whether a patient is competent to make decisions regarding medical 
treatment is far from a straightforward evaluation; in reality it is a convoluted process, 
particularly when a patient refuses life saving medical treatment. Courts overall have been 
unwilling to clearly define standards for competency
25
 and generally rely on physician 
determinations of decision making capacity.
26
 The authors of a seminal article detailing judicial 
standards for competency, Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment,
27
 argued that a clear 
test for incompetence was unlikely stating “[t]he search for a single test of competency is a 
search for the Holy Grail,” due to the different contexts in which we try to evaluate 
competence.
28
 Considering the negative consequences for a patient’s autonomy and subsequently 
their right to refuse medical treatment, with the stakes especially high in the context of terminal 
illness, this vagueness in the law is a critical issue because it provides an opening for subjective 
considerations to unduly influence judicial analysis when determining whether a patient is 
capable of making informed decisions regarding the course of their care.  
Before discussing what legal and medical commentators articulate as the legal standard of 
competency, it is worth noting that there is a difference between a physician’s determination that 
a patient possesses decision making capacity versus a court determination that an individual is 
                                                 
25 John Robertson, The Geography of Competency, 52 SOCIAL RESEARCH 555, 561 (1985) (citing V. Abernathy, 
Compassion, Control, and Decisions About Competency, 140 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHIATRY  53-5 (1984)).  
26 Thomas Hafemeister, Guidelines for State Court Decision Making in Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment Cases, 7 
ISSUES IN LAW & MEDICINE 443-75 (1992), 
http://ezproxy.shu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=f5h&AN=9608050460&si
te=eds-live. 
27 Joseph J. Fins et al., Ethical, Legal, and Psychiatric Issues in Capacity, Competency, and Informed Consent: An 
Annotated Bibliography, 18 GENERAL HOSPITAL PSYCHIATRY 155, 58 (1996). 
28 FURROW ET AL., supra note 3, at 1448 (quoting Charles W. Lidz et. al., Tests of Competency to Consent to 
Treatment, 134 AM .J. PSYCHIATRY 279, 283 (1977)).  
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competent to refuse medical treatment.
29
 Competence relates to “the mental cognitive abilities to 
perform a legally recognized act rationally,” while decision making capacity is a medical term 
which “relat[es] to the ability to make decisions in the direction of care, based on standards 
generally used by the court system.”30 The latter is a determination made by the patient’s primary 
physician, not a judge.
31
 
The goal of the competency analysis is to determine whether patients have made 
authentic decisions for the course of their medical treatment.
32
 However, because competency 
involves an evaluation made by persons other than the patient, there exists the risk that a 
patient’s wishes will be overridden if others view the patient’s choice as irrational.33 Put 
succinctly, competence refers to the patient’s ability to perform a specific task, in this case the 
ability of a patient to make medical treatment decisions.
34
 The ability to make medical treatment 
decisions requires the patient to understand the nature and consequences of a particular course of 
action.
35
  There is general agreement over what competence generally means, but the issues 
surrounding competence involve what evidence constitutes proof of competence and how that 
evidence is interpreted.
36
 
In Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment the authors assert, based on an analysis 
of legal literature and judicial commentary, that there exist several tests that courts use to 
                                                 
29 Ruth Lagman and Maria Aileen Soriano, When the Patient Says No, 29 AM. J. HOSP. PALLIAT. CARE 401, 402 
(2012).  
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Allen C. Snyder, Competency to refuse lifesaving treatment: Valuing the nonlogical aspects of a person’s 
decisions, 10 Issues in Law & Medicine 299 (1994), 
http://ezproxy.shu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=f5h&AN=9502074425&si
te=eds-live 
33 Id. 
34 ROBERTSON, supra note 25, at 561-62 
35 Id. at 562 
36 Id. 
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determine competency.
37
 According to the authors, the standards used to determine competency 
generally fall into one of five categories: (1) evidencing a choice, (2) “reasonable” outcome of 
choice, (3) choice based on “rational” reasons, (4) ability to understand, and (5) actual 
understanding.
38
 
The first test sets a very low threshold for competency and is therefore the most 
protective of autonomy; it only requires that the patient is able to show a preference for or 
against treatment.
39
 An external evaluation of the “quality” of the patient’s choice regarding care 
is not a relevant consideration.
40
 
The second test, by contrast, involves a qualitative evaluation of the patient’s decision 
and its outcome. The patient must reach the “reasonable” or “right” decision. How the patient 
came to that decision is not a relevant consideration, if the decision is not “reasonable” then the 
court will determine that the patient is incompetent.
41
 The authors note that this test is used 
“more often than might be admitted by physicians and courts…. [w]hen life is at stake and a 
court believes that the patient’s decision is unreasonable, the court may focus on even the 
smallest ambiguity in the patients thinking to cast doubt on the patient’s competency.”42  
Courts which base their analysis on what a reasonable person would do under the 
circumstances undermine the purpose of the competency analysis if the law genuinely seeks to 
protect the autonomy of the competent patient. Patients who are able to decide their choices with 
certainty through a rational thought process, but come to a decision that is deemed unreasonable, 
will be found by the court to be incompetent to make decisions regarding their medical 
                                                 
37 Charles W. Lidz et al., Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 AM .J. PSYCHIATRY 279 (1977), as 
reprinted in FURROW ET AL., supra note 3, at 1444 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id.  
42 Id. 
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treatment. The patient effectively loses control over their own bodies. The converse of this 
outcome is also possible. A patient who is unable to effectively determine their own wishes, but 
nevertheless comes to the proper conclusion supported by the physician or the court, under this 
test is deemed to be competent. Either result is a judicial determination that jeopardizes the legal 
right of a competent person to make their own medical treatment decisions. To illustrate the 
point, the authors mention courts which find a patient’s choice to refuse a blood transfusion 
based on their religious beliefs is an unreasonable refusal of medical care.
43
  
The third test, whether the patient’s choice is based on “rational” reasons, evaluates the 
patient’s choice by determining whether that choice is due to mental illness.44 Where the second 
test focuses on the reasonableness of the outcome this test focuses on the rationality of the 
patient’s decision making process. Similar to the prior test, the patient’s competence is rarely 
questioned if they consent to the course of treatment; the ability of a patient to make decisions 
regarding their medical care that reflect their wishes is not the measure of competence in this 
test.
45
 
The fourth test, the ability to understand, involves the patient’s ability to understand the 
risks, benefits and alternative courses of treatment. 
46
 The authors note that this test synergizes 
best with the doctrine of informed consent out of the various competency tests.
47
 The fact that a 
patient weighs various criteria differently or chooses an outcome at odds with the 
recommendation of the physician does not mean that the patient is incompetent per se. The test 
determines competency based on the patient’s ability to comprehend and manipulate these 
                                                 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 1445 
45 Id.  
46 Id.  
47 Id. 
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elements in order to come to a decision regarding their care.
48
 As with informed consent, perfect 
knowledge is not required in order to demonstrate understanding.
49
 
Under the final test, called the “actual understanding” test, competency is not a legal 
construct or the weighing of variables regarding treatment decisions, but whether the patient 
provides a knowledgeable consent to treatment.
50
 The authors state that this test is more reliable 
than the ability to understand test, despite the vagueness of actual understanding, because the test 
does not make the same assumptions that the prior test makes in regards to different medical 
choice decisions of similar complexity.
51
 Under the ability to understand test, if a patient shows 
that he can understand a medical decision involving a certain level of complexity, if other 
medical treatment choices are similarly complex, the patient is competent to make those 
decisions as well. The actual understanding test does not make this assumption; thus it 
determines the competence of a patient to make a treatment decision in every instance a decision 
is made.
52
 
When courts weigh in on the balance between the state interest of preserving life and the 
patient’s right to refuse medical treatment, some scholars argue that courts tend to rule in favor 
the state’s interests over patient autonomy, regardless of the patient’s capacity to make decisions 
regarding medical treatment.
53
 It is also argued that courts articulate different standards of 
competency with various thresholds in order to achieve desired medical and social outcomes 
which reflect a strong societal bias in favor of treatment; if a patient refuses treatment when the 
court perceives the benefits of the treatment to greatly outweigh the risks, the more likely a court 
                                                 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 1446 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 See e.g., Nancy Dubler & David Nimmons, Ethics on Call 26 (1992). 
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will utilize a higher standard of competency that the patient must overcome in order to exercise 
their right to refuse medical treatment.
54
 Similarly, it has been observed that physicians are more 
likely to raise the issue of a patient’s decision making capacity only if the patient refuses the 
physician’s recommended course of treatment.55 The law’s aversion to articulating set standards 
for competency, and consequentially the vagueness surrounding the competency doctrine, allows 
courts to analyze medical treatment decisions with greater scrutiny based on subjective values 
instead of the patient’s ability to perform the task of choosing the course of their medical 
treatment. This is not necessarily intentional, but may occur because of “strong societal bias in 
favor of treating treatable patients so long as it does not expose them to serious risks.”56 
Due to the abstract nature surrounding the judicial analysis of patient competency, it is 
not surprising that courts inevitably engage in discussion over subjective inquiries, such as the 
quality of a person’s life, when determining whether or not that person is competent to refuse life 
sustaining treatment.
57
 Often, courts utilize the tests for applying the concept of competency to 
individuals inconsistently; this may be due to underlying value positions which influence how 
judges view the outcome of a patient’s decision and how the patient “should” exercise their 
autonomy.
58
 If competency is a reflection of values regarding the worth of life and not a 
reflection of a patient’s ability to make medical treatment decisions, then such biases must be 
acknowledged and accounted for if the law seeks to protect individual autonomy. The case of 
Bouvia v. Superior Court is a transparent example of a court which was influenced by value 
judgments concerning the quality of life of a patient who refused life sustaining treatment, a 
                                                 
54 See FURROW ET AL., supra note 3, at 1447 (discussing the authors’ conclusion that when the benefit of treatment is 
likely to far outweigh the risk, in the mind of the evaluator, there is likely to be a low standard of competency when 
the patient consents and a high standard for competency when the patient refuses).  
55 ROBERTSON, supra note 25, at 573 
56 FURROW ET AL., supra note 3, at 1448 (quoting Charles W. Lidz et. al., Tests of Competency to Consent to 
Treatment, 134 AM .J. PSYCHIATRY 279, 283 (1977). 
57
 ROBERTSON, supra note 25,  at 564 
58 Id. 
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consideration that should be irrelevant in determining whether a patient is competent, but 
nevertheless was a central aspect of the court’s opinion.59 
II B. Judicial Evaluation of Competency 
 
The California case of Bouvia v. Superior Court is illustrative of the shortcomings of 
judicial efforts to evaluate competency. The vagueness surrounding the application of the legal 
doctrine of competency opens the flood gates to justices’ subjective biases which influence their 
analysis of the patient’s competence, potentially depriving patients of their right to control what 
is done to their own bodies for reasons that independent of the patient’s ability to make decisions 
for their medical care.  
Bouvia involved a twenty-eight year old woman, Elizabeth Bouvia, who was born with 
cerebral palsy and was a quadriplegic.
60
 Due to her illness, she was immobile and therefore 
totally dependent upon others to care for her basic needs.
61
 She expressed her desire to die and 
attempted to do so by starving herself to death.
62
 When the medical staff became worried that her 
weight loss posed a threat to her life, they inserted a feeding tube against her will, which was 
contrary to her express instructions.
63
 The Court in Bouvia noted that “a person of adult years 
and unsound mind has the right, in the exercise of control over his own body, to determine 
whether or not to submit to lawful medical treatment.”64  
Despite the Court’s declaration that a competent individual has the right to refuse medical 
treatment, the Court did not actually define competency. Additionally the opinion devoted few 
                                                 
59 Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal.App.3d 1127 (1986) 
60Id. at 1135 
61 Id. at 1136 
62 Id. at 1136-37 
63 Id. at 1137 
64 Id. (citing Cobbs v. Grant  8 Cal.3d 229, 242 (1972)) 
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words to its determination that Elizabeth Bouvia was competent.
65
 Considering that competency 
is the linchpin in the legal analysis of a patient’s ability to refuse medical treatment, it is 
surprising that the Court spent very little of its opinion on the subject. Equally surprising is the 
Court’s lengthy discussion of the qualitative aspects of Elizabeth Bouvia’s life66; in fact the 
Court explicitly stated that “the trial court mistakenly attached undue importance to the amount 
of time possibly available to the petitioner, and failed to give equal weight and consideration for 
the quality of that life; an equal, if not more significant, consideration.”67 The Court’s elusive 
discussion regarding Elizabeth Bouvia’s competency, coupled with the Court’s overwhelming 
reliance on a qualitative assessment of the patient’s life, suggests that whether Elizabeth Bouvia 
was competent depended on the quality of her life, not on her actual capacity to make a medical 
treatment decision. If competency is linked to qualitative assessments, which are subjective by 
nature, then the legal system cannot reliably protect patient autonomy.  
An amicus curiae brief by Westside Self Advocates pointed out to the Court in Bouvia 
that if a nondisabled person with Elizabeth Bouvia’s history of suicidal thoughts and emotional 
trauma were to refuse nutrition they would be diagnosed as suicidal and offered psychiatric 
treatment.
68
 Assuming that the claim in the amicus curiae brief is true it provides more credence 
to the premise that courts will view the refusal of life sustaining treatment by a disabled patient 
who is terminally ill, not as suicide committed due to mental illness, but as a competent act by a 
person who does not have as much to live for as a healthy individual. Whether a person is 
                                                 
65 Id. at 1136, 42 (“She is intelligent, very mental competent. She earned a college degree…. It is indisputable that 
petitioner is mentally competent. She is not comatose. She is quite intelligent, alert and understands the risks 
involved.”). This language constitutes the extent of the court’s discussion involving whether Elizabeth Bouvia was 
competent and why that was the case.  
66 See id. at 1136, 42-44 
67 Id. at 1142 
68 Stanley S. Herr, No Place to Go: Refusal of Life Sustaining Treatment by Competent Persons with Physical 
Disabilities, 8  ISSUES IN LAW & MEDICINE 3 (1992), 
http://ezproxy.shu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=f5h&AN=9608050469&si
te=eds-live 
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physically disabled has no place in the competency evaluation, or at the very least only a 
tangential role in determining whether a person’s choice is due to their own view of their life 
circumstances causing depression or other cognitive impairments that may affect the competency 
of the decision making. The problem is that it is assumed that these patients are competent 
because they live with circumstances that healthy individuals would not want to live with. But, 
this is not a determination of a person’s competency; it is a ruling on the quality of a person’s life 
and as such does nothing to protect vulnerable patients who are unable to exercise their 
autonomy to make an informed medical treatment decision. 
After the California Supreme Court confirmed Elizabeth Bouvia’s request to remove 
herself from life sustaining treatment, she changed her mind and decided to accept the care 
necessary to maintain her life.
69
 The Bouvia Court’s reliance on the patient’s quality of life 
implies that individuals who, in the opinion of the court, have a poor “quality of life” will be held 
competent to refuse life sustaining treatment, regardless of whether they are able to make health 
care decisions in their own interests.
70
   
Contrast the results of Bouvia with the more recent New Jersey case In re J.M.
71
 This 
case involved a terminally ill patient who was admitted to the hospital with end-stage renal 
disease, hypertension, uremia, anemia, and lupus.
72
 When she was admitted to the hospital, she 
consented to a blood transfusion to alleviate her symptoms of anemia,
73
 but refused dialysis 
treatment contrary to medical advice based on her belief that “machines that duplicate bodily 
                                                 
69 FURROW ET AL., supra note 3, at 1431 
70 See generally HERR, supra note 68 (asserting that persons with severe disabilities exhibit depressive disorders 
which affect their decision making processes, but judicial and societal biases lead most non-disabled individuals to 
believe that a disabled person who chooses to end their life is making a rational decision, due to their perceived 
quality of life, independent of the patient’s actual decision making process); see also SNYDER, supra note 32 
(arguing that courts should take into consideration depression when determining patient competency). 
71 416 N.J. Super. 222 (Ch. Div. 2010) 
72 Id. at 224-226. J.M. had a medical history of renal disease, hypertension, and lupus. 
73 Id. at 226 
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functions overly intrude into God’s domain.”74 The hospital’s own psychiatrists disagreed over 
J.M.’s decision making capacity.75 The psychiatrists who believed that J.M. lacked capacity 
argued that J.M. did not acknowledge the risk of refusing treatment, stating that according to 
J.M., God would cure her kidneys and prevent her from dying.
76
 The supporting psychiatrist 
argued that J.M. was making a voluntary choice, understood the consequences, and had the 
capacity to refuse dialysis.
77
 J.M. told him that she was aware that she might die;
78
 when the 
court directly asked J.M. if she was aware of the consequences of refusing treatment she 
responded “I understand what they are saying to me… I’m going to die, and I say I shall live and 
not die.”79 The psychiatrist further noted that it is not unusual for patients to disagree with their 
doctor’s findings and that many mentally sound patients have religious beliefs that are 
considered delusional, “while those same beliefs when held by a group of people are considered 
a religion.”80 J.M. also testified that she had seen other patients placed on dialysis and stated that 
they seemed “tired and drained” due to the procedure and that she did not want to experience the 
side effects of the treatment.
81
  
The Court found that J.M. was both competent to accept blood transfusions and to 
execute a resuscitation order, and incompetent to refuse dialysis because she was unable to 
properly “weigh the options.”82 The Court relied on the inconsistency of her medical choices in 
coming to its decision by stating “[s]he refused to acknowledge the risk inherent in her refusal of 
                                                 
74 Id. at 227 
75 Id. at 224 
76 Id. at 227 
77 Id. at 230 
78 Id. at 229 
79 Id. at 229-30. J.M. explicitly states that she understands the doctor’s view of the probable outcome of her decision 
to refuse treatment, but still she refuses based on her religious beliefs. Contrast her refusal of medical care because 
of her belief that God will cure her and that machines overreach into God’s domain with the beliefs of Christian 
Scientists who refuse all medical treatment based on their belief that prayer invokes God’s healing power.  
80 Id. at 229 
81 Id.  
82 Id. at 232 
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treatment and through her other medical choices had demonstrated an unequivocal desire to 
live.”83 The Court noted that she had no long-lasting psychiatric disability.84  
It is difficult to reconcile the different results of Bouvia and In re J.M. Courts have been 
less able to sympathize with patients who have unusual religious beliefs versus cases where 
patients have a disability that lowers their “quality of life.”85 Most of society would not choose to 
withhold life sustaining treatment based on a religious objection. Elizabeth Bouvia was a 
disabled, terminally ill patient, with a history of depression, while J.M. was a terminally ill 
patient, who was not disabled, and did not have a history of depression or other mental illness. 
The only discrepancy is the presence of a physical disability. While judges are able to 
sympathize with a disabled patient who refuses treatment because they want to end their life, 
they are less willing when the patient refuses treatment due to a religious objection based on a 
belief not held by society at large. Different patients rationally decide medical treatment 
decisions based on their evaluation of competing factors that vary in importance from person to 
person. Given that this medical decision making process is unique for every person, courts 
should not weigh in on the “rationality” of patient’s thought processes (which arguably is not an 
evaluation of the rationality of the process itself, but an evaluation of the rationality of the weight 
that a person gives to a particular element in their thought process) or the desirability of the 
outcomes of patient’s medical treatment decisions, if the law seeks to protect patient autonomy. 
Equally important is the need of courts to not shape shift the test of competency to conform with 
subjective biases. Setting the bar higher or lower based on whether the court believes a person 
has a certain quality of life does not protect autonomy, but altogether undermines it.  
                                                 
83 Id. An ironic conclusion, considering the Court’s own inconsistency by holding J.M. is both competent to make 
some medical treatment decisions and incompetent to make others.  
84 Id.  
85 FURROW ET AL., supra note 3, at 1436-37 
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III. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
Competency is not by any means an easy determination to make due to the assortment of 
legal issues and fact patterns that arise.
86
 Even amongst physicians, there is disagreement over 
how to best measure a patients decision making capacity.
87
 Often courts have encouraged their 
legislatures to take steps in order to resolve these issues.
88
 Many courts in the years following the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Cruzan have argued that life sustaining medical treatment decisions 
are inherently private decisions which should be resolved by discussions between the patient, 
their physician, and their family.
89
 Legislation has the potential to create viable alternatives to the 
legal system that adequately safeguard patient autonomy and reduce the risk that competent 
patients will be unable to exercise their right to refuse medical treatment due to subjective 
considerations. State lawmakers should pass legislation which requires the use of mediation in 
end of life disputes and allows individuals with terminal illnesses to seek physician aid in ending 
their lives without requiring court approval, but using courts as a forum of last resort. In addition 
we see that right to die legislation has been gaining traction in the United States with more 
ballots be voted on in states such as Massachusetts.
90
 These are cases of terminally ill individuals 
who in other states would have to go before a court and may not be allowed to refuse life 
sustaining treatment depending on the severity of their illness and whether they are actually 
being maintained by life sustaining treatment. The purpose of these proposed solutions is to 
                                                 
86 HAFEMEISTER, supra note 26 
87 See, Barry Edelstein e.t. a.l., Empirical advances in the assessment of the capacity to consent to medical 
treatment: Clinical implications and research needs, 26 CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW 1054, 1063 (2006) 
(analyzing studies which found that physicians inconsistently weigh different cognitive abilities in capacity 
assessments due to their specialty, their personal biases, and whether the patient refuses treatment or accepts 
treatment). 
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 HAFEMEISTER, supra note 26, n.21 
89 Id.  
90 See infra III B. i. Public Opinion,  
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create a safety valve that allows a patient to exercise their autonomy at the end of life in a 
manner that does not require them to litigate their issues in a adversarial context, but involves 
others in the decision making process so that patients are still protected from making irrational 
decisions.  
III A. Mediation 
 Mediation is a potential solution to the use of courts in disputes over the withdrawal of 
life sustaining treatment. The American Society for Bioethics and Humanities has endorsed the 
mediation approach to resolve end of life dispute treatments.
91
 State legislatures could pass laws 
which would require parties in dispute to engage in a formal mediation process presided by an 
impartial mediator trained to resolve disputes, before the parties would be able to bring their case 
before a court. 
 End of life disputes involve a variety of interested parties such as the patient, their 
physicians, and their families. When parties disagree over the patient’s choice to refuse life 
sustaining treatment, mediation creates a forum where all parties involved attempt to get to the 
bottom of the patient’s professed desire to end their lives.92 Mediation creates a dialogue where 
the patient and the other parties involved can evaluate their motives, not through the abstract 
legal construct that is the competency analysis, but through discussion that involves the emotions 
of the parties involved.
93
 An individual who evaluates their own motives in this context enhances 
their ability to make a choice regarding their treatment.
94
 Mediation provides several benefits 
aside from the self examination of the patient: it creates an outlet for emotions, involves 
                                                 
91 See American SOCIETY FOR BIOTETHICS AND HUMANITIES, CORE COMPETENCIES FOR HEALTH CARE ETHICS 
CONSULTATION 6 (1998). 
92 See David M. Shelton, Keeping End-of-Life Decisions Away from Courts After Thirty Years of Failure: Bioethical 
Mediation As an Alternative for Resolving End-of-Life Disputes, 31 Hamline L. Rev. 103, 133 (2008). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
 22 
 
mediators who have expertise in bioethics, enhances the probability that the parties involved will 
be able to amicably come to a solution, avoids the costs involved in litigation, and provides an 
outlet for resolution over the parties’ competing moral views.95 If Elizabeth Bouvia had engaged 
in a mediation process, there is a possibility that she could have arrived to the ultimate 
conclusion that she wanted to live, instead of fighting a legal battle before the court over her 
professed desire to be removed from life sustaining treatment at the time of litigation, only to 
change her mind after she won her case.
96
 
 The concept of promoting autonomy through mediation, with individuals who have 
stances different from the patient himself, at face value seems contradictory. Indeed the active 
role of family members in individual decision making is regarded as contradictory in Western 
bioethics, but in other cultures families play an active role in individual decision making 
processes.
97
 The emphasis on a western conception of autonomy in our legal jurisprudence has 
been criticized because it fails to take into account the cultural differences within our diverse 
society.
98
 The fact that patients in mediation will take into account their family’s perspective on 
the issue of life sustaining treatment is not mutually exclusive with their personal autonomy. 
Many of the choices we make in our daily lives take into account our families, yet we do not 
argue that those choices are not the product of autonomous decision making. Arguably, as a 
result of mediation, individuals are better informed on their family and physician’s positions 
regarding their treatment decisions. And by becoming aware of their own motives for accepting 
or refusing life sustaining treatment, patients are better equipped to exercise their autonomy due 
to the knowledge they gain from examining their medical treatment choices. Lastly, due to the 
                                                 
95 Id. at 134-37 
96 See supra note 69 
97 See Andrew J. McCormick, Self-Determination, the Right to Die, and Culture: A Literature Review, 56 National 
Association of Social Workers 119, 125 
98 Id. at 120 
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difficult nature of these decisions, it is important to have as many people involved in the 
discussion as possible in order to help the patient come to their ultimate conclusion. The more 
viewpoints and information that are conveyed to the patient on the issue, the better able the 
patient will be to make an informed decision, and the more support that person will have to make 
the difficult choices that occur at the end of life. 
III B. Right to Die Legislation  
III B. i. Public Opinion  
 The right to die movement, which originated in the 1970’s as a reaction to the 
technological advances in life sustaining treatment that followed World War II, enjoys the 
support of a large majority of Americans.
99
 In January of 2006, the Pew Research Center 
performed a survey that reported eighty-four percent of Americans supported laws which 
allowed patient to decide whether they wanted to continue life sustaining treatment, an increase 
from seventy-nine percent of Americans who supported such legislation in 1990.
100
 However, the 
trend towards greater public acceptance of right to die legislation has not been matched by 
increased legislative efforts.
101
 The only states which have passed laws which allow physician to 
aid the wishes of a dying patient are Oregon and Washington.
102
  
Recently a ballot initiative in Massachusetts advocating for legislation similar to the right 
to die acts in Oregon and Washington, which would allow terminally ill patients to end their 
lives with medication prescribed by their physician, was narrowly defeated in November of  
2012.
103
 Despite polls which showed that a large majority of Massachusetts citizens supported 
                                                 
99 Id. at 119  
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. It is worth noting that neither of these laws originated from the states’ respective lawmakers. Both acts came 
into being as a result of citizen passed initiatives. 
103 Carolyn Johnson, Assisted suicide measure narrowly defeated; supporters concede defeat, THE BOSTON GLOBE, 
Nov. 7, 2012, http://www.boston.com/2012/11/07/dying/gBqan95E7zK3elChciPBOP/story.html. 
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right to die legislation, when it came time to vote for the ballot there was a fairly narrow split. 
After ninety-five percent of precincts reported, the vote count show that fifty-one percent of 
voters opposed the measure.
104
 Groups in favor of the initiative argued that the “terminally ill 
have the right to end their suffering, because today dying people needlessly endure in our 
Commonwealth and do not have the right to control their most personal medical decision,” while 
those opposed argued against the initiative on the grounds that it was a flawed as written and 
consequently contained insufficient safeguards for vulnerable patients.
105
 Statistics required by 
Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act,106 were relied on by proponents of the ballot measure as 
empirical evidence that such legislation does not lead to patient coercion and abuse.
107
 The ballot 
measure, if passed would grant terminally ill patients with less than six months to live the ability 
to request their physicians for medication to end their lives.
108
  
III. B ii. Oregon’s Death With Dignity Act 
  When Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act was initially adopted in 1994 by the state’s 
voters it passed by a narrow margin of fifty-one percent to forty-nine percent.
109
 When the 
implementation of the act was delayed due to an injunction lasting until 1997, the citizens of 
Oregon defeated a repeal measure by sixty percent to forty percent.
110
 The Death with Dignity 
Act allows those years eighteen or older with a terminal illness that will lead to death within six 
months to take their own lives through the use of lethal medication prescribed by the individual’s 
physician.
111
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 Since the law was passed in 1997, a total of 935 people have had their physicians 
prescribe lethal medication and 596 patients have died.
112
  In 2011, in Oregon, the majority of 
individuals who took advantage of the law were cancer patients.
113
 Consistent with previous 
years, a large majority of individuals stated that their end of life concerns were related to their 
decreasing ability to participate in activities that made life enjoyable, loss of autonomy, and loss 
of dignity.
114
 When the Oregon initiative was challenged immediately after its passage in 1994, it 
faced a wide range of challenges; the opposition argued that it was discriminatory against the 
disabled because it would coerce people with disabilities to choose physician assisted 
death.
115
Whether the act disproportionately affects people with disabilities has not been resolved 
by the data collected, because the forms that individuals fill out do not ask whether the person 
has a preexisting disability.
116
 
 Aside from the recent initiative in Massachusetts, groups that support death with dignity 
legislation tried to pass similar initiatives in Maine in 2000, which was narrowly defeated.
117
 In 
other states, legislatures have made efforts to pass right to die legislation.
118
 The Death with 
Dignity Act has arguably marked the start of a trend in American society where we are becoming 
less hostile to the idea of allowing individuals with terminal illnesses to end their lives. It is 
likely that there will be further ballot initiatives and legislation that promote the terminal 
patient’s choice of whether or not they wish to continue.  
                                                                                                                                                             
https://www.oregonlaws.org/ors_chapters/127). 
112 OR. PUB. HEALTH DIV.: OREGON’S DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT, 1 (2011), available at 
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 Legislation like Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, are a potential alternative for the 
conscious person who is facing resistance to their decision regarding the refusal of life sustaining 
treatment. If California had such an act during Elizabeth Bouvia’s battle for her right to choose 
her own medical treatment and control her body, she may not have had to litigate the issue of her 
competency in the first place. One could argue however that Ms. Bouvia eventually decided not 
to end her life and without the courts as a barrier, she may very well have prematurely ended her 
own life contrary to her ultimate wishes. In response to this argument, going through the legal 
process was not necessary for Ms. Bouvia to come to the conclusion she did. The fact is that after 
the case was decided she had the right to end her life by removing herself from life sustaining 
treatment, a choice that she did not exercise when she had the freedom to make it. A better 
alternative would have been for her to avail herself to the type of mediation that this paper 
suggests legislator’s implement. But, in taking such concerns into account that the disabled could 
be predisposed to taking advantage of these statutes disproportionately against their interests, I 
believe that mediation could also be required before a patient is allowed to take advantage of 
right to die statutes, if that is not currently the practice.   
IV. Conclusion 
The law claims that the competency analysis is utilized in order to protect and promote an 
individual’s autonomy and their right to refuse medical treatment by deciding whether the patient 
made an authentic medical treatment decision. However, the competency analysis, due to the 
ambiguities surrounding its proper application, invites underlying value judgments of the courts 
that can be at odds with the individual autonomy that the law seeks to protect. Individuals have 
their own values that influence their thought processes and the outcomes of those values may not 
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be the same values that the court holds.
119
 The courts may not only disagree with the outcomes of 
medical treatment decisions based on a patients particular set of values, but may also interpret 
evidence through their own subjective biases. Although the Court in Bouvia declared that 
Elizabeth Bouvia’s life was not worth living, there probably many persons with disabilities in 
similar situations to Ms. Bouvia’s who do not share that view. Aside from court determinations 
of competency, even physicians themselves do not agree upon a single set of criteria for 
determining a patient’s decision making capacity. If the courts rely on physician determinations 
of decision making capacity, and the physicians themselves cannot reliably and consistently 
determine a patient’s ability to make a decision regarding their medical treatment, then it seems 
unlikely that courts will ever be able to find “the holy grail,” the ideal competency analysis, that 
both protects patient autonomy and prevents the coercion of vulnerable patients. Due to the 
uncertainty involved in competency decisions and the potential to deprive individuals of their 
autonomy, their right to refuse medical treatment, and their sovereignty over their own bodies; 
legislatures should enact laws that seek to minimize the use of the courts by parties who dispute 
life sustaining medical treatment decisions. A combination of required mediation in end of life 
disputes and the use of right to die legislation can provide a buffer for the protection of 
individual autonomy from judicial subjectivity that undermines the very thing which the law 
seeks to protect.  
  
 
  
 
                                                 
119 Courts which refuse to declare an individual competent due to decisions based on their religious beliefs is an 
example of this. 
